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PROGRAMMABLE ELECTRONIC MINING SYSTEMS:
BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS
(In Nine Parts)
Part 5:   4.0  Independent Functional Safety Assessment
By John J. Sammarco1 and Edward F. Fries2
ABSTRACT
This report (Independent Functional Safety Assessment 4.0) is the fifth in a nine-part series
of recommendations addressing the functional safety of processor-controlled mining equipment.
It is part of a risk-based system safety process encompassing hardware, software, humans, and the
operating environment for the equipment’s life cycle.  Figure 1 shows a safety framework containing
these recommendations.  The reports in this series address the various life cycle stages of inception,
design, approval and certification, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning.
These recommendations were developed as a joint project between the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health and the Mine Safety and Health Administration.  They are intended
for use by mining companies, original equipment manufacturers, and aftermarket suppliers to these
mining companies.  Users of these reports are expected to consider the set in total during the
design cycle.
• 1.0  Safety Introduction.—This is an introductory report for the general mining industry.
It provides basic system/software safety concepts, discusses the need for mining to address the
functional safety of programmable electronics (PE), and includes the benefits of implementing a
system/software safety program.
• 2.1  System Safety and 2.2 Software Safety.—These reports draw heavily from International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a,b,c,d,e,f,g] and other standards.
The scope is “surface and underground safety-related mining systems employing embedded,
networked, and nonnetworked programmable electronics.”  System safety seeks to design safety into
all phases of the entire system.  Software is a subsystem; thus, software safety is a part of the
system’s safety.
• 3.0  Safety File.—This report contains the documentation that demonstrates the level of
safety built into the system and identifies limitations for the system’s use and operation.  In essence,
it is a “proof of safety” that the system and its operation meets the appropriate level of safety for the
intended application.  It starts from the beginning of the design, is maintained during the full life
cycle of the system, and provides administrative support for the safety program of the full system.
2    Figure 1.—The safety framework and
associated guidance.
• 4.0  Safety Assessment.—The independent assessment of the safety file is addressed.
It establishes consistent methods to determine the completeness and suitability of safety evidence
and justifications.  This assessment could be conducted by an independent third party.
• 5.0  Safety Framework Guidance.—It is intended to supplement the safety framework
reports with guidance providing users with additional information.  The purpose is to assist users
in applying the concepts presented.  In other words, the safety framework is what needs to be done
and the guidance is the how it can be done.  The guidance information reinforces the concepts,
describes various methodologies that can be used, and gives examples and references.  It also gives
information on the benefits and drawbacks of various methodologies.  The guidance reports are not
intended to promote a single methodology or to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject material.
They provide information and references so that the user can more intelligently choose and
implement the appropriate methodologies given the user’s application and capabilities.
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BACKGROUND
The mining industry is using programmable electronic (PE) technology to improve safety, increase
productivity, and improve mining’s competitive position.  It is an emerging technology for mining
that is growing in diverse areas including longwall mining systems, automated haulage, mine
monitoring systems, and mine processing equipment.  Although PE provides many benefits, it  adds
a level of complexity that, if not properly considered, may adversely affect worker safety [Sammarco
et al. 1997].  This emerging technology can create new hazards or worsen existing ones.
PE technology has unique failure modes that are different from mechanical systems or hard-wired
electronic systems traditionally used in mining.  PE includes microprocessors, embedded controllers,
programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and the associated software.
The use of a safety life cycle helps to ensure that safety is applied in a systematic manner for all
phases of the system; thus reducing the potential for systematic errors.  It enables safety to be
“designed in” early rather than being addressed after the system’s design is completed.  Early
identification of hazards makes it easier and less costly to address them.  The life cycle concept is
applied during the entire life of the system since hazards can become evident at later stages or new
hazards can be introduced by system modifications.  The safety life cycle for mining is an adaptation
of the safety life cycle in part 1 of IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a].
System safety activities include identifying hazards, analyzing the risks, designing to eliminate or
reduce hazards, and using this approach over the entire system life cycle.  These system safety
activities start at the system level and flow down to the subsystems and components.  More detailed
information on the fundamentals of system safety is presented by Sammarco et al. [1999].
This report incorporates some of the “best practices” for safety in the world and some of the latest
international thinking on safety for PE.  It uses a key group of standards selected from about
200 safety standards pertaining to PE.  These key standards are listed in table 1.
Existing safety standards are built on collections of expertise and experiences (lessons learned)
involving fatalities, injuries, and near misses of systems using PE.  In general, standards also provide
uniform, systematic approaches.  History has shown standards to be an effective tool for safety
[Leveson 1992].  Thus, by adapting existing standards, mining can build upon the valuable
information captured in these standards documents.
51.0 Introduction
1.1 Document Conventions
This report follows a general format where major sections consist of an objective and associated
recommendations.  The formats are as shown.
Objective(s):
Recommendation(s):
NOTE:
The NOTES give brief clarification, reasoning, or guidance. More in-depth information is found in
supplemental guidance documents.
1.2 Scope
The scope is “surface and underground safety mining systems employing embedded, networked, and
nonnetworked programmable electronics.”  Information on background, introduction, key
documents, and additional definitions not covered in this document can be found in the System
Safety document 2.1 [Sammarco and Fisher 2001], Software Safety document 2.2 [Fries et al. 2001],
and Safety File document 3.0 [Mowrey et al. 2002].
1.3 General
1.3.1 These recommendations do not supersede Federal or State laws and regulations.
1.3.2 These recommendations are not equipment- or application-specific.
1.3.3 These recommendations do not serve as a compliance document.
1.3.4 These recommendations apply to the entire life cycle for the mining system.
1.3.5 These recommendations apply mainly to the safety-related parts of the system.  However,
many of the recommendations can also be applied to the basic system.
1.4 Purpose
The purpose of this document is to provide recommendations for an independent person or persons
conducting a Functional Safety Assessment of a programmable electronic mining system.  These
recommendations address an assessment process covering the preliminary, initial, and periodic
followup phases.  It also addresses the specific safety documentation for a safety file, management
of change, and a proven in use service history.
62.0 Key Documents
2.1 This recommendation document is based on information and concepts from the
documents listed in table 1.  References for these standards can be found in System Safety
document 2.1 [Sammarco and Fisher 2001].
Table 1.—Key documents used for these recommendations
Standard identification Title
IEC 61508 Parts 1-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
  related systems.
ANSI/ISA S84.01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Application of safety instrumented systems for the process industries.
ISA Draft Technical Report and TR84.0.02 -
   Parts 1-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS); Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Evaluation
   Techniques.
MIL-STD-882C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Standard practice for systems safety program requirements.
UK Def Stan 00-58 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HAZOP studies on systems containing programmable electronics.
ANSI/UL 1998, 2nd edition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Software in programmable components.
3.0 Definitions
The definitions are directly from IEEE Standard 610.12-1990 IEEE Standard Glossary of Software
Engineering Technology, IEC 61508, and the System Safety Analysis Handbook [Stephans and Talso
1997].  A few definitions are adaptations or newly formed definitions specific to mining.
Action Item - A noted issue or task that the system/equipment provider should resolve before
completing the Functional Safety Assessment or Followup Safety Assessment.
Error - A discrepancy between a computed, observed, or measured value or condition and the true,
specified, or theoretically correct value or condition.
 
Fail-Safe - Pertaining to a system or component that automatically places itself in a safe operating
mode in the event of a failure, e.g., a traffic light that reverts to blinking red in all directions when
normal operation fails.
Followup Safety Assessment - A systematic, independent, and periodic assessment to determine
if the safety integrity of the product/machine/control system previously evaluated by the Functional
Safety Assessment is being maintained.  This assessment may include design modifications, fixes,
etc., applied to the assessed product.  This assessment should determine whether the actual
procedures and rules specific to the functional safety requirements comply and adhere to the planned
procedures and rules and that the planned procedures and rules are implemented effectively and
suitably to achieve the specified safety objectives.
Functional Safety Assessment - A systematic analysis and study, based on evidence, to judge the
functional safety achieved by one or more electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE)
safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems, or external risk reduction facilities.
This assessment further includes a systematic and independent examination to determine whether
the actual procedures and rules specific to the functional safety requirements comply and adhere to
7the planned procedures and rules and that the planned procedures and rules are implemented
effectively and suitably to achieve the specified safety objectives.  Thus, the Functional Safety
Assessment is a complete and independent assessment of the work processes, design, development,
testing, and safety file documentation for a product/machine/control system to determine compliance
with applicable safety recommendations/standards/regulations.
NOTE 1: The degree of independence depends on the SIL (see table 2).
Hazard - Environmental or physical condition that has the potential for causing injury to people,
property, or the environment.
Independent Person - A person who is separate and distinct from the activities and direct
responsibilities taking place during a specific phase of the overall electrical/electronic/programmable
electronic system (E/E/PES) or software safety life cycle that is subject to Functional Safety
Assessment or validation.
Independent Department - A department that is separate and distinct from the departments
responsible for the activities, subject to Functional Safety Assessment or validation, taking place
during the specific phase of the overall E/E/PES or software safety life cycle.
Internal Assessment - Conducted by the service/equipment provider to determine that the design
and development process continues to comply with the safety plans and the safety file procedures.
A report is issued and reviewed by appropriate management personnel.
Management of Change - Discipline of identifying the components of an evolving system for the
purposes of controlling changes to those components and maintaining continuity and traceability
throughout the life cycle.
Preliminary Functional Safety Assessment (PFSA) - An assessment before and/or during the
product development process to determine if the appropriate design/development process controls
have been or are being implemented and the recommended work products (safety file
documentation) are planned for, are being, or will be produced.  This assessment is not intended to
determine if the product/machine/control system being designed and produced complies with
applicable recommendations/standards/regulations, but that the procedural controls and processes
applied during the design and development of such equipment and work products are in accordance
with those recommendations/standards/regulations.  The PFSA is conducted by those meeting the
recommended level of independence of table 2.
Programmable Electronics (PE) - Refers to electronically programmable or configurable devices
(e.g., embedded controller, programmable logic controller, single-loop digital controller, distributed
control system controller) that are effectively the “brain” of a PE system.
8Programmable Electronic System (PES) - Any system used to control, monitor, or protect
machinery, equipment, or a facility that has one or more programmable electronics (PE), including
all elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways
and other communications paths, and actuators and other output devices.
Risk - The combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and severity of that harm.
Safety - Freedom from unacceptable risk.
Safety Instrumented System - System composed of sensors, logic solvers, and final control
elements for the purpose of taking the mining system to a safe state when predetermined conditions
are violated.  Other terms commonly used include “emergency shutdown system,”  “safety shutdown
system,” and “safety interlock system.”
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) - One of three possible discrete integrity levels (SIL 1, SIL 2, SIL 3)
of safety instrumented functions.  SILs are defined in terms of quantitative or qualitative methods.
SIL 3 has the highest level of safety integrity.
NOTE 2: SILs apply to safety functions of systems, protection layers, and devices using PE.  “SIL” is a term used
to specify the probability that a safety function satisfactorily performs given a set of conditions and constraints.
SIL 1 - Safety Integrity Level 1 indicates that a failure may be expected to result in an injury to
persons requiring nonemergency medical treatment or damage to property requiring nonextensive
repairs.
SIL 2 - Safety Integrity Level 2 indicates that a failure may be expected to result in serious injury
to persons requiring emergency medical treatment or damage to property requiring moderate repairs
and/or temporary shutdown of operations.
SIL 3 - Safety Integrity Level 3 indicates that a failure may be expected to result in life-threatening
injury to persons or damage to property requiring extensive repairs and/or prolonged shutdown of
operations.
Safety Life Cycle - The necessary activities involved in the implementation of safety-critical
systems.  The activities begin at the concept stage and cease after the systems’ decommissioning.
Software - Computer programs, procedures, and possibly associated documentation and data
pertaining to the operation of a computer system.
Software Safety Integrity - Measure that signifies the likelihood of software in a programmable
electronic system achieving its safety functions under all stated conditions within a stated period
of time.
Software Safety Integrity Level - One of three discrete levels for specifying the safety integrity
of software in a safety system.
9Software Safety Program Plan - The Software Safety Plan (SWSP) specifies the safety
requirements for the software in a programmable electronic system and describes how the
requirements will be met and how it will be demonstrated that the requirements have been met.  The
SWSP also describes the functionality, safety features, and operating modes of the software.
Software Verification - To the extent required by the safety integrity level, a test and evaluation
of the outputs from a given software safety life cycle phase to ensure correctness and consistency
with respect to the outputs and standards provided as inputs to that phase.
System Safety Program Plan - The System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) specifies the safety
management and requirements for a programmable electronic system and describes how the
requirements will be met and how it will be demonstrated that the requirements have been met.  The
SSPP also describes the functionality, safety features, and operating modes of the system.
Third Party - An organizational division, subsidiary, or other organization that is separate and
distinct, by management and other resources, from the organization or department responsible for
the activities, subject to Functional Safety Assessment or validation, taking place during the specific
phase of the overall E/E/PES or software safety life cycle.
Validation - The activity of demonstrating that the safety system under consideration, before or after
installation, meets in all respects the safety requirements specification for that safety system.
Verification - The activity of demonstrating for each phase of the relevant safety life cycle by
analysis and/or tests that, for the specific inputs, the deliverables meet in all respects the objectives
and requirements set for the specific phase.
4.0 Independent Functional Safety Assessment Plan
Objectives:
4.1 To assess if appropriate methods, techniques, and processes have been used to—
•  Identify and analyze all reasonably foreseeable hazards and risks
•  Mitigate the identified hazards and risks to achieve an appropriate level of safety
•  Assign SILs
•  Verify that the SIL is met
•  Document the system with a safety file document
4.2 To assess if adequate evidence exists to support and document 4.1.
4.3 To create a plan enabling a systematic, consistent, and comprehensive Functional Safety
Assessment.
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Recommendations:
4.4 The Functional Safety Assessment Plan should be created by the manufacturer,
integrator, or system end-user.  Ideally, the plan should be a collaborative effort by the manufacturer,
system integrator, and system end-user.
4.5 The Functional Safety Assessment Plan should accommodate incremental implementation
carried out in parallel with the system’s development.
4.6 The Functional Safety Assessment Plan should be divided into three parts:
• Part 1 - Preliminary Independent Functional Safety Assessment
• Part 2 - Initial Independent Functional Safety Assessment
• Part 3 - Followup Functional Safety Assessment
NOTE 3: The Functional Safety Assessment Plan is applied to the process of developing and maintaining a
programmable system for a particular piece of equipment at a particular mining site.  The required document attributes
to be reviewed by an assessor increase in scope with the SIL.  See table 5 for a listing of these attributes.
4.7 Items that a Preliminary Independent Functional Safety Assessment should address
include—
• A review of the preliminary safety file
• Evidence of the intent to provide a means to increase the likelihood of successfully
completing the Initial Functional Safety Assessment
4.8 Items that an Initial Functional Safety Assessment should address include—
• Evidence that it was preceded by a Preliminary Functional Safety Assessment
• An assessment of the safety file for the system under review
• Intentions to confirm and document the SIL for the system or equipment and SILs
for all subsystems
• An assessment to determine the capability to maintain these SILs
Appendix A contains a typical agenda for the Independent Functional Safety Assessment.
4.9 Items that the Followup Safety Assessment should address include—
• An analysis of the modification control documents and revised risk analysis
• A successful completion of the Initial Independent Functional Safety Assessment
• A scheduled assessment in accordance with the established SIL of the system or
equipment (see table 4)
• A level of assurance that the system/equipment provider continues to be capable of
maintaining the established SIL
Appendix B contains a typical agenda for the Periodic Followup Safety Assessments.
4.10 The independent Functional Safety Assessment Plan should accommodate various levels
of independence that vary in relation to the SIL, as shown in table 2.
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Table 2.—Recommended degree of independence
Degree of independence SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
Independent person . . . . . . . HR HR nr
Independent department . . . — HR HR
Third party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — HR
HR = highly recommended.    nr = not recommended.
A dash (—) indicates no recommendation.
Source:  Adapted from IEC [1998a].
Other application-specific factors may also be used to help determine the appropriate level of
independence [IEC 1998a]:
1. Greater complexity
2. Greater novelty of design
3. Greater novelty of technology
4. Lack of standardized design
5. Higher SIL requirement
6. Lack of experience with a similar design
7. Lack of service history
5.0 Independent Functional Safety Assessment Processes
5.1 Preliminary Independent Functional Safety Assessment
Objectives:
5.1.1 To provide an early independent Functional Safety Assessment of the system, plans, and
preliminary safety file so as to reduce the potential for costly rework at the final stages of
assessment.
5.1.2 To provide an early independent Functional Safety Assessment of the SIL(s) so as to
reduce the potential for costly rework at the final stages of assessment because of an inappropriate
assignment of SIL(s).
Recommendations:
5.1.3 The Independent Functional Safety Assessment Plan should be part of the preparation
for the Initial Independent Functional Safety Assessment.
5.1.4 The following reports and plans should be considered as inputs:
• The system/equipment description
• The System Safety Plan
• The Software Safety Plan
• Documents and procedures for the safety file
• Quality assurance policies, procedures, and processes
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5.1.5 The following steps should be considered as the process:
(1) A review of the declared SIL with respect to the type of mining product or system
to be produced
(2) A review of the System Safety Plan
(3) A review of the Software Safety Plan
(4) Review of documented procedures for the safety file
(5) Review of the risk management procedures and initial risk assessment activities
5.1.6 The output should result in a report indicating the level of conformance of the plans and
procedures with that expected for the declared SIL.
5.1.7 The results of the Preliminary Independent Functional Safety Assessment should be
documented in a preliminary report containing the following information [U.K. Ministry of Defence
1996]:
• A description of the assessment’s scope
• A very brief description of the system and the application domain of the system
• A listing of all documentation examined
• A listing of all reference material used for the assessment
• A listing of all SILs that are adequately designated and justified
• A listing of SILs lacking sufficient support and justification, if any exist
• A listing of concerns or deficiencies
• A summary of results
• Identification of the assessor(s) and their associated affiliations
5.1.8 The Preliminary Independent Functional Safety Assessment should be conducted on a
per-system basis for a given application.
5.1.9 Although the Preliminary Independent Functional Safety Assessment is desirable, it is
an option exercised at the discretion of the manufacturer.  The Preliminary Independent Functional
Safety Assessment becomes more desirable as the SIL increases, as shown in table 3.
Table 3.—Recommended preliminary safety assessment schedule
SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
Preliminary safety assessment . . . . — R HR
R = Recommended.    HR = highly recommended.
A dash (—) indicates no recommendation.
5.2 Initial Independent Functional Safety Assessment
Objectives:
5.2.1 To obtain an Independent Functional Safety Assessment that the system/equipment
provider has established and has the capability to maintain the appropriate safety integrity level for
the programmable electronics and software in the system/equipment provided.
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Recommendations:
5.2.2 The following should be considered as inputs:
• Product or system description
• Qualified and authorized system/equipment provider personnel
• Registered quality system or equivalent
• Safety file for the system/equipment
• Independent qualified assessor to conduct the assessment
• Proven in use evidence conforming to the recommendations of section 8.0
5.2.3 The following steps should be considered as the process:
(1) A review of the documents submitted by the manufacturer as evidence of compliance
(2) Review of documented procedures
(3) Review of the configuration management system applied to the system/equipment
during development and at production time
(4) Review of the risk/hazard analysis and prioritization of identified risks at the
system/equipment level
(5) A detailed analysis of the risk management design and implementation
(6) A traceability analysis of system risk mitigation throughout the defined development
life cycle processes, including verification means at each defined breakpoint
(7) Verification and validation tests to be selected and witnessed by the independent
assessor
NOTE 4: The review acquires information from the staff members involved about the design and safety management
practices as implemented in the product development life cycle.
NOTE 5: The system/equipment provider is responsible for the resolution of all action items.
5.2.4 The following should be provided by the independent assessor as output:
(1)  Assessment report
(2)  Periodic Followup Safety Assessment Plan
5.2.5 The results of the Independent Functional Safety Assessment should be documented in
a  report containing the following information [U.K. Ministry of Defence 1996]:
• The assessment result (see NOTE 6)
• A description of the assessment’s scope
• A description of the system and the application domain of the system
• A listing of all documentation and document version numbers examined
• A listing of all reference material used for the assessment
• A listing of all SILs that are adequately designated and justified
• A listing of SILs lacking sufficient support and justification, if any exist
• Identification of prior service history information used in the assessment, if any such
information exists
• A listing of safety claims lacking sufficient support and justification
• A listing of action items to change the assessment category to acceptance
• A summary of results
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• Identification of the assessor(s) and their associated affiliations
NOTE 6: The assessment result can be one of three categories:  acceptance, qualified acceptance, or rejection.
5.2.6 The Initial Independent Functional Safety Assessment should be conducted on a
per-system basis for a given application.  For example, the assessment would specifically address
a given make and model of continuous mining machine for use at a specific mining site.
NOTE 7: Models can be based on common components with specific features being added/deleted or enabled/
disabled based on user requirements.  Results of previous Functional Safety Assessments may be reused as long as these
assessment data are augmented with data from additional assessments of the impact of changes made.
5.3 Periodic Followup Safety Assessments
Objectives:
5.3.1 To obtain an Independent Functional Safety Assessment of the system/equipment
provider’s continued capability to maintain the appropriate safety integrity level for the
programmable electronics and software in the system/equipment provided.
Recommendations:
5.3.2 The following should be considered as inputs:
• Initial Functional Safety Assessment Report
• System/equipment provider’s internal assessment reports
• Records of changes/modifications to the software and programmable electronics
• Records of the reevaluated and updated safety file
• Qualified and authorized system/equipment provider personnel
• Registered quality system or equivalent
• Independent qualified assessor
• Records of changes in the user/application environment, as appropriate
NOTE 8: If the use of the equipment has changed, then there may be a need for redesign, testing, and validation.
This may or may not be known to the equipment vendor; thus, the term “as appropriate” is added.  However, whenever
there is ongoing dialogue during equipment servicing about changes in use of the equipment, it is important to consider
the impact of these changes on the achievement of functional safety.  Examples of changes to be considered include
adding or removing other protective functions or changing operating procedures.
5.3.3 The following steps should be considered as the process:
(1) A review of the system/equipment provider’s documented internal assessment plan
and reports
(2) A review of the risk management summary
(3) A review of the defined process for initiating a change request, modifying the
hardware and/or software, and updating the associated documentation, including—
(a) The risk analysis and the determination that the proposed changes do
(or do not) impact the programmable electronics and/or software.
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(b) An explanation summarizing the software changes and a brief rationale for
making these changes (e.g., additional functionality requested from the
customer; a bug fix; the removal, improvement, and/or addition of a software
feature; etc.).  Depending on the complexity of the proposed changes, the
auditor may request additional documentation to get a more detailed
description of the changes.
(c) The verification and validation activities relating to the software changes,
regression testing, and results of the implementation of the verification and
validation activities and testing.
NOTE 9: Again, the system/equipment provider is responsible for the resolution of all action items.
The Periodic Followup Safety Assessment is determined during, but scheduled after, the Initial
Functional Safety Assessment.  Table 4 details the recommended audit schedule based on the SIL.
Table 4.—Recommended safety assessment schedule
SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
Annual safety assessment . . . . . . . — HR HR
Semiannual safety assessment . . . — R HR
HR = highly recommended.    R = Recommended.
A dash (—) indicates no recommendation.
NOTE 10: This table follows the degree of independence specified in table 2.  Thus, if a third-party assessment is
recommended by table 2, then the followup assessment should also be performed by a third party.
5.3.4 The following should be provided as output:
• Report provided by the independent auditor
• Update Independent Functional Safety Assessment documents, as needed
5.3.5 The report should include—
• Identification of the system/equipment provider
• A listing of all documentation and document version numbers examined
• A listing of all reference material used for the audit
• A listing of management and safety processes used for the development and
maintenance of systems that are deficient
• A listing of management and safety processes for the development and maintenance
of systems that lack evidence that the processes are being used consistently and
properly
• A listing of action items to change the audit category from “rejection” or “qualified
acceptance”
• A summary of results
• Identification of the assessor(s) and their associated affiliations
Table 5.—Safety file document assessment attributes
Safety file
document sets Attributes
SIL
1 2 3
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Risk management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Risk management summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Hazard identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Hazard/risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
SIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Risk prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Risk control measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Traceability to risk management documents . . . . . . . . X X X
Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Measurable/verifiable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Memory management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Timing constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Units of measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Hardware platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Block diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Hardware/software interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Hierarchical diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Memory mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Traceable to the requirements specifications . . . . . . . . X X X
Defined risk-addressed state(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Site transitions with events and actions . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Error handling routines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Data dictionaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Control flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Data flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Traceable to the design specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Coding standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Tools used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Maintainability, documented, modular . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
No extraneous code or added unspecified features . . . X
Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Test cases are traceable to the risk analysis and
   requirements specification.
X X X
Completion criteria defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Design reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Static analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Dynamic analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Branch coverage testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Unit tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Integration tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Test tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Traceability analysis throughout document sets . . . . . . X X X
Product testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Independent validator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
Document control procedures . . . . . . . . . Identification code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Revision history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Provider authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X
Configuration management procedures . . Version(s) identifier(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Revision history of modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X X X
Risk analysis reviewed before modification . . . . . . . . . X X X
Assigned personnel only for modifications . . . . . . . . . . X X
Authorization procedures as specified in the MOCP . . X X X
5.3.6 The safety assessment may address multiple systems because the safety assessment
focuses on the system provider’s safety processes and plans.
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6.0 Assessing the Safety File
Objectives:
6.1 To evaluate the adequacy of the safety file based on attributes of the system and the
development process as described in the documents that comprise the safety file.
NOTE 11: These attributes are listed in table 5, and the SIL at which each attribute is assessed is indicated.  The
required attributes increase in scope with the SIL.  The higher the SIL, the larger the set of attributes that must be
satisfied.
Recommendations:
6.2 Assessment shortcomings should be identified and documented by the Independent
Functional Safety Assessment party.  Shortcomings should be identified by the following
classifications:
• Missing evidence or justification
• Insufficient evidence or justification
• Inappropriate evidence or justification
7.0 Management of Change (MOC)
Objectives:
7.1 To obtain an Independent Functional Safety Assessment that the system/equipment
provider has conducted a safety analysis of proposed change(s) and has established the appropriate
safety integrity level(s) for the programmable electronics and software in the system/equipment
provided.
7.2 To obtain an Independent Functional Safety Assessment that the system/equipment
provider has implemented MOC for the programmable electronics and software in the system/
equipment provided in accordance with the Management of Change Plan (MOCP).
Recommendations:
7.3 Modifications of programmable electronics and software in the system/equipment should
be assessed for safety as recommended by table 6.
Table 6.—Recommended Management of Change
Degree of independence SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
Independent person . . . . . . . HR HR nr
Independent department . . . — HR HR
Third party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — HR
HR = highly recommended.    nr = not recommended.
A dash (—) indicates no recommendation.
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7.4 The Independent Safety Assessments in table 6 should be completed and assessed as
passed before implementing the change(s).
7.5 The Independent Functional Safety Assessment should assess the safety analysis of
proposed change(s) and the proposed safety integrity level(s).
7.6 The Independent Functional Safety Assessment of proposed change(s) should include
an audit of the MOCP.
8.0 Proven in Use (Service History)
Objectives:
8.1 To use systems, subsystems, and components having a proven and documented safe
history of service, but lacking formal and rigorous verification.
8.2 To facilitate the Functional Safety Assessment of systems, subsystems, and components
by using prior functional safety assessments.
8.3 To facilitate the Functional Safety Assessment of systems by using prior functional safety
assessments of the same system for a different application and installation.
8.4 To facilitate the Functional Safety Assessment of systems with a service history.
Recommendations:
8.5 The independent functional safety assessor may accept existing systems under the proven
in use concept.
8.6 The proven in use concept should support, justify, and validate functional safety by
producing documented evidence of a safe service history.
8.7 Safe service history documentation should include incident rates and severity, as well
as problem reports of in-service problems that may have not resulted in an incident.
8.8 Safe service history documentation should include—
• Exposure data
• Environmental conditions
• Operational profiles
• Maintenance frequencies and rigor
• MOC data
• Random hardware failure data
NOTE 12: Exposure data could include the length of service history and the number of systems.  One system operating
for 1 year has a much lower exposure than 50 systems operating for 1 year.
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8.9 The safe service history duration, in terms of failure-free operating hours, should increase
with respect to the SIL, as shown in table 7.
Table 7.—Recommended safe service duration
for various SILs
SIL Hazard-freeoperating hours
1 . . . . . . . . . 3 × 102
2 . . . . . . . . . 3 × 103
3 . . . . . . . . . 3 × 104
NOTE 13: A failure resulting in a fail-safe condition or state is considered hazard-free.
8.10 The Initial Independent Functional Safety Assessment must assess functional safety in
the context of the entire system.
NOTE 14: Safety is an emergent property of the entire system.  All of the individual parts of a new system could have
a safe service history.  However, the safe service history of the parts alone does not provide assurance that these parts
will combine and function safely in a new system.
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APPENDIX A.—TYPICAL AGENDA FOR INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL
SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The Independent Functional Safety Assessment consists of eight primary activities:
(1)  An introduction
(2)  A review of documentation
(3)  An analysis of the configuration management system and its application
(4)  An analysis of the risk management process
(5)  A review of safety-related design issues
(6)  A traceability analysis of hazard mitigation throughout the development process
(7)  Test witnessing
(8)  A closing meeting
The following section lists the specific items reviewed during each of these parts.
NOTE 15: Those items identified by the Preliminary Functional Safety Assessment may be part of the PFSA process.
The items so identified may be selected as needed based on the timing of the PFSA during the design/development
life cycle.
(1) Introduction (PFSA)
• Review agenda
• System/equipment demonstration or explanation
(2) Document Review
• Mapping of documents to required attributes (see table 5) (PFSA)
• Review of documents
< User documents for appropriate cautionary statements of residual risk
< Document control procedures (PFSA)
< Configuration management procedures (PFSA)
< PES development plan, safety life cycle project management plan (PFSA)
< Risk management plan; procedures for risk identification, analysis, and control (PFSA)
< Verification and validation procedures and assignment of personnel (PFSA, test plan
only, procedures are likely under development)
< Modification/change control procedures (PFSA)
< Internal assessment plan/report (PFSA, identification plan/procedures only)
(3) Applied Configuration Management System
• Description of the PES life cycle phases, including (PFSA, only life cycle phases)—
< The defined inputs and expected outputs
< The verification methods used to verify the outputs of each life-cycle phase
< The validation to requirements
< Determination of the point in the initial development that configuration management
(CM) is formally applied for each software component of the system (PFSA, CM
Plan only)
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< Version numbers for each software component of the system and how the version
number for the system is derived from the version numbers for each subsystem (PFSA,
identification plan/procedures only)
(4) Risk Management 
• Risk management summary (PFSA)
• Hazard identification
• Risk identification
• Risk analysis
• Risk categorization with rationale
• SIL categorization for each risk with SIL categorization rationale
• Risk control measures with rationale
(5) Review of Safety-Related Design
• State transition diagrams
• Fail-safe state
• Error handling routines
• Partitioning
• Software architecture
• Hardware architecture
• Functional block diagrams
(6) Traceability
• Review documentation for traceability of safety requirements and hazard mitigation
throughout all life cycle phases.  The objective is to account for each safety requirement and
hazard mitigation, thereby reducing errors of omission.
• Follow several threads (specific items) throughout the documents.
(7) Test Witnessing
• Review of test equipment, setup, and procedures
• Version/identification tests
These tests pertain to the identification of the correct software version.  These are tests
run at the time of production that verify that the correct version of software has been
integrated with the hardware platform.
• Memory Testing
Testing should cover memory testing and management appropriate for the required SIL.
Write-protected RAM, ROM, or other write-protected memory tests should detect
injected or simulated faults and respond with the appropriate response.  Memory
management tests should demonstrate that program code resides in ROM or other write-
protected memory and cannot be overwritten.
NOTE 16: IEC 61508 Part 7 [IEC 1998g] contains an overview of testing techniques for detecting memory failures.
• Boundary Condition Testing
This type of testing pertains to the examination of behavior approaching and exceeding
boundary conditions.
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• Error handling tests for timing errors, parameter checking, and computational errors
• Selected tests from verification plan traceable to the risk analysis
(8) Closing Meeting (PFSA)
• Assessment report discussion
• Action items
• Planning for next action
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APPENDIX B.—TYPICAL AGENDA FOR PERIODIC FOLLOWUP
SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The Periodic Followup Safety Assessment consists of eight primary activities:
(1)  An introduction
(2)  A review of documentation
(3)  An analysis of the configuration management system and its application
(4)  An analysis of the risk management process
(5)  A review of changes made to safety-related design
(6)  A traceability analysis of hazard mitigation throughout the development process
(7)  Verification testing
(8)  A closing meeting
While the scope of the Independent Functional Safety Assessment addresses both the complete
system and the full development life cycle, the scope of the Periodic Followup Safety Assessment
addresses only changes and modifications to the system once the Independent Safety Assessment
is completed.  The following section lists the specific items reviewed during each of these parts.
(1) Introduction
• Review agenda
• System/equipment demonstration/explanation
(2) Document Review
• Internal assessment reports
• Problem reports
(3) Applied Configuration Management System
• Engineering change orders
• Configuration control
(4) Risk Management
• Risk management summary
• Risk identification 
• Updated risk analysis
• Prioritizing identified risks with rationale
• Risk control measures with rationale
(5) Review of Changes to Safety-Related Design
• State transition diagrams
• Fail-safe state
• Error handling routines
• Partitioning
• Software architecture
• Hardware architecture 
• Functional block diagrams
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(6) Traceability Analysis
For changes or new items, review documentation for traceability of safety requirements and
hazard mitigation throughout all life cycle phases.  The objective is to account for each new
or changed safety requirement and hazard mitigation, thereby reducing errors of omission.
(7) Verification Testing
• Regression testing
• Revalidation
(8) Closing Meeting
• Assessment report discussion
• Action items
• Planning for next action
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APPENDIX C.—COMPETENCE OF PERSONS
Source:  Adapted from IEC 61508-1 Annex B [IEC 1998a]
C.1.0 Objective
To outline considerations for ensuring that persons with responsibilities for any overall E/E/PES or
software safety life cycle activity are competent to fulfill those responsibilities.
C.2.0 General considerations
All persons involved in any overall E/E/PES or software safety life cycle activity, including
management activities, independent assessment, and independent audit activities, should have the
appropriate training, technical knowledge, experience, and qualifications relevant to the specific
duties they must perform.
C.2.1 The education, training, experience and qualifications of all persons involved in any
overall E/E/PES or software safety life cycle activity, including any management of functional
safety activities, should be assessed in relation to the particular application.
C.2.2 The following factors should be considered when assessing the competence of persons:
  (1) Engineering knowledge appropriate to the mining application area.
  (2) Engineering knowledge appropriate to the technology (e.g., electrical, electronic,
programmable electronic, software engineering).
  (3) Safety engineering knowledge appropriate to the technology and the mining application area.
  (4) Knowledge of the legal and safety regulatory framework for mining.
  (5) The consequences in the event of failure of the E/E/PE safety-related systems:  the greater
the consequences, the more rigorous should be the specification and assessment of
competence.
  (6) The SILs of the E/E/PE safety-related systems:  the higher the SIL, the more rigorous should
be the specification and assessment of competence.
  (7) Novel, newer, or more untried designs, design procedures, or applications should have more
rigorous specification and assessment of competence.
  (8) Previous experience and its relevance to the specific duties to be performed and the
technology being employed:  the greater the required competence levels, the closer the fit
should be between the competencies developed from previous experience and those required
for the specific duties to be undertaken.
  (9) The training, experience, and qualifications of all persons involved in any overall E/E/PES
or software safety life cycle activity should be documented.
(10) Relevance of registrations and certifications (e.g., Registered Professional Engineer,
Software Quality Engineer Certification, Certified Safety Professional (CSP), Registered
Assessor for the Conformity Assessment of Safety-Related Systems (CASS) [CASS Scheme
Ltd. 2002], Associate Safety Professional (ASP)).
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APPENDIX D.—INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST
AND WORKSHEET
Objectives:
D.1.0 To facilitate a structured and systematic assessment.
D.2.0 To facilitate the identification and recording of key items of the assessment.
Recommendations:
D.3.0 Safety File Products
D.3.1 The Functional Safety Assessment should focus mainly on the various products or
components of a safety file.  An example checklist is given below to help assess the completeness
of the safety file [Mowrey et al. 2001].
NOTE 17: The checklist in this appendix is for example purposes.
SAFETY SUMMARY DOCUMENTATION
Accept Reject
_____ _____ Safety statement
_____ _____ Risk management summary (provided in SSPP and SWSP)
_____ _____ Reference file (index and cross-references of all documents, contacts)
_____ _____ Personnel qualifications file
Comments:
SAFETY PLANS
Accept Reject
_____ _____ System Safety Program Plan (just reference if provided separately)
_____ _____ Software Safety Plan (just reference if provided separately)
_____ _____ Management of Change Plan (just reference if provided separately)
_____ _____ Operation and Maintenance Plan(s) (just reference if provided separately)
_____ _____ Safety Validation Plan (just reference if provided separately)
_____ _____ Installation and Commissioning Plan (just reference if provided separately)
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Comments:
SAFETY DATA AND METHODS DOCUMENTATION
Accept Reject
_____ _____ Product description (vendor’s sales literature, general specifications,
features)
_____ _____ Implementation document
_____ _____ User documents (operator’s manual, maintenance manual, training manual)
_____ _____ History files
_____ _____ Hazard log
_____ _____ Hazard and risk analysis methods
_____ _____ Risk categorization methods
_____ _____ SIL categorization methods
_____ _____ System safety requirements
_____ _____ Software safety requirements
_____ _____ Proven in use documentation, if applicable
Comments:
SAFETY FILE CONCLUSION
Accept  Reject
_____ _____ Summary/conclusions
_____ _____ Signed statement affirming that the system is safe to operate
Comments:
NOTE 18: It is highly recommended to first develop a preliminary high-level safety file during the initial design phase
of the system, always keeping in mind that all safety-related claims need to have a justifiable basis, i.e., sufficient
evidence and reasonable argument.  Formal documentation at this stage is not necessary, but might eventually be required
for a third-party assessment.
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D.4.0 Safety Processes
D.4.1 The programs, procedures, and processes, separate from or referenced by the Safety
Plans, that form the basis of project management and special implementing procedures unique to the
product/machine/control system being designed and developed.
HIGH-LEVEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
Accept  Reject
_____ _____ Quality Assurance Policy and Implementing Procedures
_____ _____ Configuration Management Program and Implementing Procedures
_____ _____ Document Control Program and Implementing Procedures
_____ _____ Drawing Control Program and Implementing Procedures
_____ _____ Electronic Information System Policy and Implementing Procedures
_____ _____ Internal Assessment/Audit Program and Implementing Procedures
_____ _____ Procurement Policy and Implementing Procedures
_____ _____ Recordkeeping Policy and Implementing Procedures
_____ _____ Measuring and Test Equipment Control and Calibration Program
Comments:
PROJECT LEVEL PROCEDURES AND PROCESSES
Accept Reject
_____ _____ Project-Specific Document Control Procedure(s)
_____ _____ Project-Specific Software Configuration Management Procedure(s)
_____  _____ Project-Specific Inter-Intra-Departmental Interface Procedure(s)
_____ _____ Project-Specific Review Procedure(s)
_____ _____ Project-Specific Software Coding Conventions
_____ _____ Project-Specific Procurement Procedure(s)
_____ _____ Project-Specific Recordkeeping Procedure(s)
_____ _____ Project-Specific Measuring and Test Equipment Procedure(s)
Comments:
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